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Forensic Science: Hair Comparison Evidence
Paul C. Giannelli* and

Emmie West**

Introduction
Hair evidence may be invaluable in some criminal prosecutions, 1 but it
is often abused. The publication of a 1996 Department of Justice report
discussing the exoneration of twenty-eight convicts through the use of DNA
technology highlights this point. 2 Some of these convicts had been sentenced
to death. In several of these prosecutions, hair analysis was used to obtain
the conviction.

Edward Honaker
In this case, the expert testified that the crime scene hair sample ''was
unlikely to match anyone" other than the defendant, Edward Honaker. 3 A
prosecutor would later acknowledge that "[t]here was no question that the
state hair expert [at Honaker's trial] had overstated the distinctiveness of the
hair recovered from the victim's shorts in his trial testimony. " 4 This com-

* Albeti J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University. This column is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 1999). Reprinted with permission.
** Class of 2002, Case Western Reserve University.
1
Genera1ly, after making the determination that a sample is a hair and not a fiber,
an analyst can determine: (1) whether the hair is of human or animal origin, (2) the
sex of the person who was the source of the hair, (3) the race of the person who was
the source of the hair, (4) the part of the body that the hair came from, (5) whether
the hair has been dyed, (6) whether the hair was pulled or fell out due to natural
causes or disease, (7) the presence of poisons or drugs, (8) whether the hair was cut
or crushed, and (9) the ABO blood grouping of the hair source. See 2 P. Giannelli &
E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence§ 24-2 (3d ed. 1999); Imwinkelried, "Forensic
Hair Analysis: The Case Against the Underemployment of Scientific Evidence," 39
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 41 (1982).
2
E. Connors, T. Lundregan, N. Miller & T. McEwen, Convicted by Juries,
Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (1996)[hereinafter "Exonerated by Science"].
3
Id. at 58.
4 H. Levy, And the Blood Cried Out: A Prosecutor's Spellbinding Account of the
PowerofDNA 153 (1996).
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ment is a gross understatement. At best, the expert could have testified that
the hairs were "consistent," which means that they could have come from
Honaker or thousands of other people. A competent expert should have
known this. A competent prosecutor should have also known this. Honaker
spent ten years in prison. DNA proved him innocent. Indeed, another hair
examiner would later opine that ''the hairs were not comparable.' ' 5
There were other problems in the use of scientific evidence in this case.
First, the fact that the prosecution witnesses had been hypnotized prior to
trial was not revealed until the post trial proceedings. 6 This is a patent
constitutional violation. 7 Second, "Honaker had a vasectomy in 1977, but
the vaginal swab recovered intact sperm, inconsistent with Honaker's aspermic state. " 8 The defense did not pursue this issue. This case represents all
that is so troublesome in criminal litigation-bad lawyering (on both sides)
combined with bad expert testimony.

Roger Coleman
Roger Coleman was executed in 1992 for a 1981 slaying in rural Virginia. The same expert who had testified against Honaker also testified
against Coleman. 9 The United States Supreme Court mled that a lawyer's
mistake in filing Coleman's state collateral appeal (one day late) precluded
5

J. Tucker, May God Have Mercy: A True Stmy of Crime and Punishment 345
(1997) ("With the cooperation of a conscientious prosecutor, Kate Germond had
the hairs reexamined by one of the world's leading experts on hair analysis and
DNA tests perfonned on spenn found on a vaginal swab taken from the victim at the
time of the rape. The hair expert said that in his opinion the hairs were not comparable, and the DNA analysis proved beyond doubt that Honaker was not the rapist.'').
6
Levy, supra note 4, at 153.
7
E.g., Orndorff v. Locld1art, 998 F.2d 1426, 1436, 39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 283
(8th Cir. 1993), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, (913513)(Aug. 3, 1994) (prosecution's failure to notify the defense that a witness had been hypnotized constituted a
confrontation violation because it deprived the accused of the opportunity to crossexamine the witness on this issue), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1060 (1994); U.S. v.
Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 827 (2d Cir. 1969) (new trial granted because the prosecution
failed to inform the defense that a key witness had undergone hypnosis); Brown v.
State, 426 So. 2d 76, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. lst Dist. 1983) (disapproved of by,
Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985)) ("[D]ue process demands that counsel be
afforded a fairer means by which to prepare his defense to this critical evidence.'');
State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, 395 (1983); Gee v. State,
662 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1983).
8
Levy, supra note 4, at 153. There were other problems. See also id. ("The rapist
spoke obsessively about Vietnam; Honaker had never been there. Both the victim
and her fiance were sure that the rapist held the gun in his left hand, and Honaker
was right-handed.").
9
See Tucker, supra note 5, at 345 ("In October 1994, after nearly ten years in
prison, Edward Honaker was released. The state forensic expert who had testified in
1985 that the hairs were comparable and unlikely to have come from anyone other
than Honaker was Elmer Gist.'')
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federal habeas review. 10 Serious questions about Coleman's innocence have
been raised, and the prosecution's use of hair evidence was problematic, at
the very least. 11 In his book on the Coleman case, John Tucker interviewed
the trial judge who underscored the crucial nature of the hair evidence:
"Years later, in response to the author's question about what evidence in the
case he thought had the most powerful impact on the jury, Judge Persin said
it was Elmer Gist's testimony about the comparison of the pubic hairs. It
was, Judge Persin observed, the first and only testimony that seemed to tie
Roger Coleman to the murder specifically. '' 12 As Tucker correctly notes: ''A
finding of consistency is highly subjective, and experts may and often do
disagree about such a finding. " 13 Nevertheless, at trial the prosecutor
''described, with great emphasis, the scientific evidence, and especially the
comparison of the pubic hairs, asserting that 'it would be extremely unlikely
that anyone else would have hair that would be consistent with this hair.'' ' 14
Unfortunately for Coleman, the defense counsel failed to challenge this statement.15 Tucker describes the testimony as follows: Nor did [the expert]
compare the pubic hairs found on Wanda [the victim] with anyone other
than Coleman and Wanda herself-not even her husband Brad. Nevertheless, when he asserted that he had made a comparison of those hairs with
Roger's pubic hair, and that the hairs were "consistent" with each other,
meaning, he said, that is was ''possible, but unlikely'' that the hairs found
on Wanda could have come from anyone other than Roger Coleman, the
jurors exchanged glances and settled back in their seats. 16
10

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640
(1991).
11
See Tucker, supra note 5; Taylor, "Was An Innocent Man Executed?," American Lawyer 40, 40-41 (Dec. 1997))('Td put the odds that Coleman was innocent
somewhere above fifty-fifty." "The state's hair evidence was shown (after the trial)
to be far from probative and far from reliable."). See also Tabak, "Death Penalty
Be Not Proud," 84 A.B.A. J. 80, 80 (Jan. 1998)("[D]efense counsel did not seriously challenge a highly dubious hair comparison that greatly influenced the jury.
The lawyer who dealt with the evidence had never examined a hair expert before.' ')(reviewing Tucker's book).
12 Tucker, supra note 5, at 75 ("According to Gist, he had microscopically
compared the pubic hair found on Wanda McCoy with those removed from Roger
Coleman on March 13, and they were 'consistent.'"); id. at 51 ("Unlike fingerprints,
hairs are not positive identifiers, and unlike blood types, there is no scientifically accepted figure for the number or percentage of people whose hair is 'consistent' with
one another. . . . But as Jack Davidson and Mickey McGlothlin !mew, or would
soon find out, Elmer Gist had often testified, and would surely testify again, that it is
'possible, but unlikely' that consistent hairs could come from different people.'').
13 Id. at 51.
14 Id. at 63.
15 Id. at 64 ("The scientific evidence was ignored altogether, leaving unchallenged McGlothlin's exaggerated claim about the importance of the public hairs.").
16 Id. at 76.
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Ron Williamson
The use of hair evidence in convicting the ilmocent is also discussed in
Scheck, Neufeld and Dwyer's Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution
and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted. 17 They include a chapter
on Williamson v. Reynolds/ 8 a federal habeas corpus case. There, an expert
testified at trial that hair samples were "consistent microscopically." 19 The
expert then went on to explain what this meant: ''In other words, hairs are
not an absolute identification, but they either came from this individual or
there is-could be another individual somewhere in the world that would
have the same characteristics to their hair.' ' 20 However, the federal district
court noted that the "expert did not explain which of the 'approximately'
twenty-five characteristics were consistent, any standards for determining
whether the samples were consistent, how many persons could be expected
to share this same combination of characteristics, or how he arrived at his
conclusions. " 21 Moreover, the district court professed that it had "been
unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair
comparison testimony meets any of the requirements' ' 22 of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 23 the Supreme Court case setting forth a
reliability test for the admissibility of scientific evidence. The district court
observed: ''Although the hair expert may have followed procedures accepted
in the commmlity of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in this
case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable. " 24 Finally, as is often the
case, the prosecutor exacerbated the problem by stating in closil1g argm11ent,
"There's a match. " 25 Even the state court misinterpreted the evidence, writing that the "hair evidence placed [petitioner] at the decedent's apartment.' ' 26 The district court decision was subsequently reversed on this
ground. 27 Nonetheless, the defendant was later exonerated by exculpatory
17

B. Scheck, P. Neufeld & J. Dwyer, Actual Innocence Imwcence: Five Days to
Er:ecution and Other Dispatchesji·om the Wrongly Convicted (2000).
18
Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff'd,
110 F.3d 1508 (lOth Cir. 1997), rev'd on this ground, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (lOth
Cir. 1997).
19
ld. at 1554.
20
Id. (emphasis added).
21 Id.
22

ld. at 1558.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct.
2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1 (1993) (" [U]nder the Rules the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant, but reliable.'').
24
Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1558.
25
ld.at1557.
26 ld.
27
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (1Oth Cir. 1997) (due process, not
Daubert, standard applies in habeas proceedings).
23
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DNA evidence, and as Scheck and his colleagues point out, "The hair evidence was patently unreliable.' ' 28

Steven Paul Linscott
As Williamson demonstrates, the misleading nature of hair evidence
may be attributable to the prosecutor rather than the expert. People v. Linscott29 is illustrative. In this case, ''the prosecutor argued that hairs found in
the victim's apartment and on the victim's body were in fact defendant's
hairs. " 30 Reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote: "With these statements, the prosecutor improperiy argued that the hairs removed from the
victim's apartment were conclusively identified as coming from defendant's
head and pubic region. There simply was no testimony at trial to support
these statements. In fact, [the prosecution experts] and the defense hair expert
. . . testified that no such identification was possible.' ' 31 DNA testing
exculpated Linscott. 32

Other Innocents
Several other convicts later exonerated by DNA also had to confront
hair evidence at their trials: David Vasquez 33 and Dennis Williams. 34 One of
the most infamous cases involved the prosecution of Glen Woodall. 35 The
expert in the Woodall case was Trooper Fred Zain, chief serologist in West
28

Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 146. See also id. at 134 ("Not
until December 1985, three years after the murder, did the state finish its first report
on the hair examination. A trained hair man named Melvin Hett concluded that
thirteen hairs found around the victim's body appeared to have come from the head
and pubis of Dennis Fritz [an alleged accomplice]. Another four hairs from the murder scene were linked to Ron Williamson. By itself, though, the hair report was not
strong enough to prove capital murder.'').
29 People v. Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22, 153 Ill. Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355 (1991).
30
Id. at 1358.
31
Id. at 1359.
32
See Exonerated by Science, supra note 2, at 65 ("The State's expert on the hair
examination testified that only 1 in 4,5000 person would have consistent hairs when
tested for 40 different characteristics. He only tested between 8 and 12 characteristics,
however, and could not remember which ones. The appellate court mled on July 29,
1987, that his testimony, coupled with the prosecution's use of it at closing arguments, constituted denial of a fair trial.")( citation omitted).
33
Id. at 73 (discussing Vasquez case). David Vasquez was also convicted based
upon a false confession. Indeed, Vasquez, who was borderline retarded, pled guilty.
His confession was based on a dream, and ''his account was incoherent and inconsistent." The police convinced Vasquez that his fingerprints were found at the scene,
and then they fed him the details of the crime. See P. Mones, Stal/dng Justice: The
Dramatic True Story of the Detective Who First Used DNA Testing to Catch a Serial
Killer 54 (1995); Giannelli, "The DNA Story: An Altemative View," 88 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 380 (1997).
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Virginia, who reported the results of phantom lab tests for a decade-all
favoring the prosecution. Even after he left the state, West Virginia prosecutors sent him evidence to examine because they could no longer get the
''right'' results from their own crime lab. A judicial inquiry concluded that
''as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by
Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid,
unreliable, and inadmissible." 36 The West Virginia Supreme Court opinion
adopting this judicial investigative report speaks of ''shocking'' and
"egregious violations," "corruption of our legal system," and "mock[ing]
the ideal of justice under law.' ' 37 An accompanying report states:
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the
strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic
matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items
of evidence had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5)
reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that
genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to
report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting
additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with
a suspect when testing supported only a match with the victim; and (ll)
reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results. 38

Misconduct
Zain was not the only government official who abused his office in using
hair evidence. In Nelson v. Zanfl 9 the critical evidence was a hair found on
the victim's body. The state's expert testified that the hair not only could
have come from the defendant but that it could only have come from about
120 people in the entire Savannah area. The prosecution failed to disclose
34

See Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 184 (discussing the Williams
case)("And then there was the Caucasian hair collected from the backseat of Williams' car. The state's lab expert said three of the hairs matched the victims' hair.
[The defense attorney] didn't talk to any other forensic experts. Years later, it would
be shown that the hair was nothing like the victims'.'').
35
Id. at 111 (''Then there was the single reddish-brown hair recovered from the
car. Could the hair have come from anyone but Glen Dale Woodall's beard? 'Highly
unlikely,' was Zain' s answer."); id. at 113 ("Just three months before the trial, Zain
had written a report stating that it was a pubic hair-not, as he would testify in court,
a beard hair from Woodall. The other expert who examined the hair said that it bore
no similarities to any ofWoodall's hair, from any part of his body."). See also Giannelli, ''The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories," 4 Va. J. Social Policy & L. 439 (1997).
36
ln reInvestigation of theW. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501,502 (W.Va. 1993).
37
ld. at 518.
38
Id. at 516.
39
Nelson v. Zant, 261 Ga. 358,405 S.E.2d 250 (1991).
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that the FBI had also examined the hair and concluded that it was not suitable for comparison purposes. On review, the prosecution argued that the
hair evidence was not ''material'' within the meaning of Brady. 40 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed.
Scheck and his colleagues provide other illustrations, including cases
where laboratory results were inconsistant and where important information
was deleted. 42

Court Cases
In the past courts 43 have upheld the admissibility of hair evidence under
the Frye general acceptance test. 44 Recent cases have followed this trend,
even under Daubert. In Johnson v. Commonwealth 45 the Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of hair evidence. Because hair comparison
evidence had been accepted by Kentucky courts and other state courts, the
supreme court held that trial courts in Kentucky could take judicial notice
that hair comparison evidence was scientifically reliable. Thus, the proponent
of hair comparison evidence does not need to prove reliability; the burden
shifts to the opponent of the evidence to prove umeliability. The court also
rejected Johnson's argument that there was no proficiency testing for hair
analysis as there is for DNA analysis, since, unlike DNA analysis, hair analysis depends on the skill of the person making the comparison. One justice
dissented, noting that "Appellant's future is, both literally and figuratively,
hanging by a hair.' ' 46 The dissenting justice correctly believed that the hair
comparison evidence should have been scrutinized in accordance with Daubert. He noted that the level of acceptance of scientific techniques can change
over time and judicial notice ''should be reserved for the rare occasion when
the evidence sought to be admitted is seemingly beyond dispute, such as, for
example, evidence that the sun rises every day in the east, or acknowledgment of the law of gravity.' ' 47 Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme Court has
ruled that '' [b ]ecause the scientific principles and procedures underlying hair
40

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87,83 S. Ct. 1194,10 L. Ed. 2d215 (1963)
("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'').
42
Id. at 167 (Timothy Durham case) ("There was something else she had never
seen before: the tips of the pubic hairs had been cut, as if shaved by a razor. This
was such a remarkable fact that Hair Examiner Cox did not even mention it in her
written report.").
43
E.g., U. S. v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 363, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 492 (6th Cir.
1979); People v. Watkins, 78 Mich. App. 89, 259 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1977).
44
293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). See 1 Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, ch. 1
(discussing the Frye test).
45
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999)
46
Id. at 267.
47 Id.
520
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and fiber evidence are well-established and of proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as 'technicallmowledge.' Thus, an
independent reliability determination was mmecessary.' ' 48

Challenging Hair Evidence
Despite these cases, hair evidence-if overstated-is vulnerable to attack. Significantly, the attack on hair evidence in Williamson ultimately
failed not because the evidence satisfied Daubert but because Daubert was
not the appropriate standard of review of state evidentiary findings in federal
habeas proceedings. The attack on admissibility should be continued even
though courts have upheld the admissibility of hair evidence.

Subjectivity
First, as noted above, opinion testimony conceming the comparison of
hairs is subjective. 49 One study focused on this subjectivity and examiner
bias: "The findings of the present study raise some concem regarding the
amount of unintentional bias among human hair identification examiners.
. . . A preconceived conclusion that a questioned hair sample and a known
hair sample originate from the same individual may influence the examiner's
opinion when the samples are similar.' ' 50

Positive Identifications
Second, the expert should not make a "positive" identification-i.e.,
that two hairs match to the exclusion of all other persons. If an expert insists
48

State v. Fukusaku, 85 Haw. 462, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997). See also
McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (hair comparison admissible,
more a matter of observation by persons with specialized lmowledge than a matter
of scientific principles); McCarty v. State, 1995 OK CR 48,904 P.2d 110, 125 (Olda.
Crim. App. 1995) (admitting hair evidence).
49
Miller, "Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair,"
11 Law & Hum. Behav. 157, 157-58 (1987)("Hair cannot be 'individualized' as
with fingerprints. Human hair characteristics (e.g., scale patterns, pigmentation,
size, etc.) vary within a single individual. . . . Although the examination procedure
involves objective methods of analysis, the subjective weights associated with the
characteristics rest with the examiner.").
50
I d. at 161. This study reports that the usual method of human hair analysis is
less accurate than an alternative line-up procedure, due to outside sources of influence on the examiner. In the conventional method the examiner is given hair samples
from a lmown suspect along with a report including other facts and information relating to the guilt of the suspect. The line-up method gives the examiner hair samples
from the suspect along with hair samples with similar characteristics from other
individuals. The examiner is in no way informed which samples come from the
suspect or even if there is a particular suspect. In short, using the line-up method
may reduce the impact of preconceived opinions and result in less false positives.
521
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on making a positive identification, the expert should be asked the basis of·
this opinion. What scientific text supports this? If it is only based on personal
experience, the expert should be asked how many hair examinations the
expert has conducted. Suppose the expert replies: "500 examinations."
Often, the 500 examinations did not involve comparing each hair against the
other 499. Rather, the expert examined three hairs in one case and six in another; the three hairs in the first case were never compared with six hairs in
the second case.

"Consistent With" Testimony
Third, if the expert testifies that the accused's exemplars are ''consistent
with'' the crime scene hairs, the expert should concede on cross-examination
that the hair could have come from a person other than the accused. Once the
expert makes this concession, the cross-examiner could take the expert ''up
the ladder": The crime scene hair could have come from 5 other persons, 10,
50, 100, 500, 1,000, 100,000 and so forth-until the expert balks. But why
does the expert balk? What scientific text supports a lower number? 51

Proficiency Testing
Fourth, as Scheck and his colleagues note, ''In the early 1970s, the U.S.
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) sponsored a proficiency testing program for 240 laboratories that provided evidence in criminal cases. The labs botched many kinds of tests: paint, glass, rubber, fibers.
But by far, the worst results came from hair analysis.' ' 52 The study cited was
a 1978 Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program sponsored by the LEAA. 53
Over 200 crime laboratories pmiicipated in this program, which involved
such common forensic examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and trace evidence analyses. Seventy one percent of the crime laboratories tested provided
unacceptable results in a blood test, 51.4 percent made errors in matching
paint samples, 35.5 percent erred in a soil examination, and 28.2 percent
made mistakes in firearms identifications. The Report concluded: "A wide
range of proficiency levels among the nation's laboratories exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for the laboratories. . . .'' 54 As
51

See Thorton, "The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 2 Modern Scientific Evidence§ 20-9.2.3, at 28 (Faigman et al. 1997) ("In an
inclusionary mode, . . . hair is a miserable form of evidence. The most that can be
said about a hair is that it is consistent with having originated from a particular
person, but that it would also be consistent with the hair of numerous other people.
Stronger opinions are occasionally expressed, but they would not be supportable.'').
52
Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 162.
53
J. Peterson, E. Fabricant & K. Field, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Research Program 188-89 (L.E.A.A. Oct. 1978).
54
Id.at3.
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for the five hair tests, 55 the unacceptable rates were: (A) 50.0 percent, 5 6 (B)
27.8 percent, 5 7 (C) 54.4 percent, 58 (D) 67.8 percent,59 and (E) 35.6 percent. 60
A later study showed similar results. 61 Between 1980 and 1991, crime
laboratories were given eight hair proficiency tests in which the exercises
ranged from identifying species of anima] hairs to identifying the area of the
human body from which a hair originated. In two separate tests, an average
of 44 percent and 30 percent of the laboratories correctly identified the species of anima1. 62 When trying to determine the location of human hair, an
average of 56 percent of the laboratories were correct, with greater success
identifying hair as coming from the pubic and head region than identifying
hair from the beard, arm, and chest regions. 63 The authors of the study
concluded: "Animal and human (body area) hair identifications are dearly
55

The tests consisted of five sample items: (A) dog hair, (B) cat hair, (C) deer
hair, (D) cow hair, and (E) mink hair.
56
I d. at 232. Of the 90 laboratOiies tested, 19 identified the dog hair as coming
from some animal other than a dog, 17 identified the hair only as ''non-human,'' 8
reported inconclusive results, and 3 reported no results. Forty-three laboratories correctly identified the hair.
57
Id. at 232. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 13 identified the cat hair only as ''nonhuman," 6 identified the hair as coming from some animal other than a cat, 3
reported no results, and 2 reported inconclusive results. Sixty-six laboratories correctly identified the hair.
58
I d. at 232. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 3 I identified the deer hair as coming
from some animal other than a deer, 10 identified the hair only as "non-human," 4
reported inconclusive results, and 4 reported no results. Forty-one laboratories correctly identified the hair.
59
I d. at 252. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 36 identified the cow hair as coming
from some animal other than a cow, 12 identified the hair only as "non-human," 7
reported inconclusive results, and 4 reported no results. Thirty-one laboratories correctly identified the hair.
60
Id. at 232-33. Of the 90 laboratories tested, 17 identified the minlc hair as coming from some animal other than a mink, 12 identified the hair only as ''nonhuman,'' 4 reported no results. Fifty-seven laboratories correctly identified the hair.
61
Peterson & Markham, ''Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, I 9781991, I: Identification and Classification of Physical Evidence, 40 J. Forensic Sci.
994, 1007 (1995) ("In sum, laboratories were no more successful in identifying the
correct species of origin of animal hair . . . than they were in the earlier LEAA
study.").
62
I d. at I 004-05. In the first test, 76 percent of the laboratories tested correctly
identified deer hair, 28 percent correctly identified opossum hair, and 28 percent correctly identified bear hair. In the second test, 45 percent correctly identified squirrel
hair, 36 percent correctly identified moose hair, and 9 percent correctly identified
fox hair.
63
Id. at 1004-05. Ninety-six percent of the laboratories tested correctly identified
human wig head hair, 87 percent conectly identified human head hair, 84 percent
correctly identified human pubic hair, 40 percent coiTectly identified human arm
hair, 33 percent coiTectly identified human beard hair, 25 percent correctly identified
human beard/facial hair, and 25 percent correctly identified human chest/body hair.
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the most troublesome of all categories tested.' ' 64 In another series of hair
tests, the examiners had to "include" or "exclude" in comparing known
and unknown samples: "Laboratories reported inclusions and exclusions
which agreed with the manufacturer in approximately 74 percent of their
comparisons. About 18 percent of the responses were inconclusive, and 8
percent in disagreement with the manufacturers' information." 65

Statistical Evidence
Not content with "consistent with" testimony, some experts have used
statistical probability evidence in presenting their conclusions. For example,
in United States v. Massey 66 the expert testified that three of five hairs found
in a blue ski mask similar to one worn by one of the robbers were microscopically similar to the defendant's hair. He also cited a study for the proposition
that there was a one in 4,500 or one in 2,000 chance of his identification being wrong. The prosecutor emphasized these numbers in closing argument,
telling the jury that the ''hair sample would be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt because it is so convincing.' ' 67 The Eighth Circuit correctly found
plain error. Similarly, in State v. Carlson 68 the Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled probability hair evidence inadmissible.
The issue also arose in United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 69
where the "one in 4,500" probability was again used. During its deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the judge: ''Has it been
established by sampling of hair specimens that the defendant was positively
proven to have been in the automobile?" 70 Surprisingly, the conviction was
upheld on a nanow ground-i.e., in habeas proceedings the misuse of evidence violates due process only in extreme cases. 71 Unfortunately, the
64

Id. at 1007.
Peterson & Markham, "Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 19781991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. Forensic Sci. 1009, 1023
(1995). See also id. at 1022 ("Examiners warned that "they needed to employ particular caution in interpreting the hair results given the virtual impossibility of
achieving complete sample homogeneity.'')
66
U.S. v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979).
67
Id. at 681.
68
State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Millil. 1978).
69
U.S. ex rei. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1982).
70
Id. at 516.
71
Id. at 519 (''The Constitution does not and, indeed, cannot guarantee that only
completely reliable evidence will be placed before the jury. Although it does demand
that a defendant be given a full and fair opportunity to challenge whatever evidence
is admitted, DiGiacomo was afforded that opportunity here. Through his counsel, he
was free to challenge Dillon's testimony if it was not true, or clarify it if it was
misleading. He was also free to call his own expert if he thought Dillon's testimony
was at odds with the established views of the scientific community. DiGiacomo in
fact did none of these things. No attempt was made to cross-examine Dillon regard- ·
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Seventh Circuit did not appreciate that it was confronting that "extreme"
case.
Although the "one in 4,500" was derived from published studies, 72
these estimates, as one commentator notes, "are easily challenged. " 73 Two
other corrimentators reviewed the research in this field. 74 Almost all empirical evidence conceming human hair comparison is based on the experiments
of one man (Gaudette). 75 Before courts admit figures of statistical probability
based on Gaudette's findings, critical examination is required. One major
flaw in his study was the lack of "blindedness"; he knew that each match
was a false positive. This flaw is compounded by the fact that hair analysis is
subjective since every hair, even hair from the same individual, is variable.
Hair examiners are simply looking for unaccountable differences, but there
are no objective guidelines to follow. Another problem is that some people
have ''featureless hair"-their hair has very few unique characteristics. Gaudette's study does not estimate the frequency of' 'feahireless hair,'' nor does
he account for the impact that this might have on his numbers.
Furthermore, important differences between Gaudette's controlled testing and the forensic setting exist. Gaudette did not account for precomparison exclusions that would be common in a criminal investigation. If
a suspect is known to be Caucasian, the police are not going to present the
hair examiner with samples from an African American individual. Gaudette's comparison of hair samples with such obvious differences will inflate
the statistical results in favor of true positives. Another important difference
between Gaudette's study and forensics is the expe1iise and reliability of the
examiners. Gaudette was probably more careful than the average technician,
and as already stated, hair analysis is very subjective. Finally, there is the issue of outside influence and preconceived bias. When a hair analysis expert
gets a sample in the forensics world, it is usually because that individual is
ing her testimony that hairs found in Marik's car belonged to the defendant.")(citation omitted).
72
See Gaudette & Keeping, "An Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human
Scalp Hair Comparison," I 9 J. Forensic Sci. 599 (1974); Gaudette, "Probabilities
and Human Pubic Hair Comparison," 21 J. Forensic Sci. 514 (1976).
73
D. Kaye, Science in Evidence 28 (1997). See also A. Moenssens, J. Starrs, C.
Henderson & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Civil alnd Criminal Cases 578 (4th ed.
1995) ("The problem with using these statistics is that, while they appear to tell the
jury that the likelihood is great that we are dealing with a near positive match between the crime scene hair and the hairs known to have come from the defendant,
that is not at all what they mean.'').
74
Smith & Goodman, "Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century
Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?," 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227,231
(1996) "If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of validating
hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should
excluded altogether from criminal trials.'').
75
Although human hair analysis has generally been accepted into American
courts as a reliable science, since the only practical use of hair analysis is in the
criminal setting its exposure to scientific evaluation is very limited.
525

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

already a suspect. Any outside influence is likely to taint the examiner's
belief as to the validity of the match. Although Gaudette made a worthwhile
effort to support the use of hair analysis in criminal investigations, the
opinion of more than one person should be required before such evidence
may be introduced in court. 76

Basis Of Testimony
One of the more remarkable hair cases ended up in the United States
Supreme Court. In Delaware v. Fensterer77 the Supreme Court considered a
confrontation challenge involving the basis of expert testimony. In that case
an FBI analyst testified that hair found at a murder scene had been forcibly
removed. He further testified that three methods were available to make this
determination, but he could not remember which method he had used to
reach his conclusion. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the expert's
lack of memory precluded the defense from testing the basis for the opinion
by cross-examination and thus violated the right of confrontation. 78
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. In the Court's view,
"[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given
a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities through crossexamination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for
giving scant weight to the witness' testimony. " 79 The Court went on to hold
that such an opportunity had been provided at tlial, noting that the ''defense
counsel's cross-examination of Agent Robillard demonstrated to the jury
that Robillard could not even recall the theory on which his opinion was
based.' ' 80 The Court, however, did caution that its decision was limited to
the facts presented. 81 Nevertheless, on remand the Delaware Supreme Court
again held the opinion inadmissible, but on evidentiary, rather than
constitutional, grounds. According to the comi: "While a witness's mere
lack of memory as to a particular fact may go only to the weight of that evidence, an expert witness's inability to establish a sufficient basis for his
76

Smith & Goodman, supra note 72, at 257 ("Despite the paucity of empirical
study upon which a hair expert may rely when testifying about the probability of
matching hairs, experts have nonetheless testified in a number of cases to specific
probabilities of match hairs based on statistical studies of mysterious origin.'').
77
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 18 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 945 (1985).
78
Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. 1985), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 945
( 1985).
79
474 U.S. at 22.
80
Id. at 20.
81
Id. ("We need not decide whether there are circumstances in which a witness'
lapse of memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination that admission of the witness' direct testimony violates the Confrontation Clause.'').
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opinion clearly renders the opinion inadmissible under D.R.E. 705." 82 No
matter what the U.S. Supreme Court may say about the Constitution, expert
testimony based on a "forgotten" methodology is worthless as a matter of
science and evidence law.

DNA Testing
The advent of DNA evidence alters the use of hair evidence. If the root
of a hair is recovered, it may be analyzed by several DNA methods: RFLP,
PCR, STRs. 83 In addition, mitochondrial DNA has been used for this purpose.84 State v. Counci/ 85 was the first reported case.

Conclusion
As noted earlier, hair evidence may be invaluable in some cases. Nevertheless, it is also one ofthe most abused types of scientific evidence. It should
be challenged as a matter of routine.
82 Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, 1109-10 (Del. 1986).
83 See Linch, Smith & Prahlow, "Evau1ation of the Human Hair Root for DNA
Typing Subsequent to Microscopic Comparison," 43 J. Forensic Sci. 305 (1998); 2
Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, ch. 18.
84 See Allen et al., ''Mitochond1ial DNA Sequencing of Shed Hairs and Saliva on
Robbery Caps: Sensitivity and Matching Probabilities, 43 J. Forensic Sci. 453
(1998). See also Savolainen & Lundeberg, ''Forensic Evidence Based on DNA
from Dog and WolfHairs," 44 J. Forensic Sci. 77 (1999).
85
State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1050, 120 S. Ct. 588, 145 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1999). See Curriden, "A New Evidence
Tool: First Use of Mitochondrial DNA Test in a U.S. Criminal Trial," 82 A.B.A. J.
18, 18 (Nov. 1996) (therape-murderofa 4-year-old girl was solved from a small red
hair found in the victim's throat). Previously, RFLP and PCR has been used, both of
which test for DNA in the cell nucleus. MitochondJial DNA is found outside the cell
nucleus and is inherited from the mother.
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